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 1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
 
 
 Appellee Blue Ledge Corporation (hereinafter "Blue Ledge") disagrees with 
the statement of the issues in the opening brief of Appellant Nadine F. Gillmor 
(hereinafter "Gillmor").  The issues, properly framed, with the applicable standards 
of review, are as follows: 
Issue I: Summary Judgment Quieting Title in Blue Ledge to Disputed 
Property 
 
 Because Blue Ledge's predecessor in title received fee title to the disputed 
real property by a May 22, 1929 patent from the United States and because Gillmor 
claims title to the same real property through a subsequent December 20, 1930 
patent from the United States, was Blue Ledge entitled to summary judgment to 
quiet title in Blue Ledge to the disputed real property? 
Issue I:   Standard of Review:  Correctness 
 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Because a 
summary judgment presents questions of law, the Court of Appeals reviews the 
district court's ruling for correctness.  Johansen v. Johansen, 2002 UT App. 75, 45 
P.3d 520. 
Issue II:   Dismissal of Gillmor's Adverse Possession Claim for Failure to 
Prosecute 
 
 Because Gillmor had failed to prosecute her adverse possession claim for 
over thirteen years and offered no excuse to the district court for her delay, was 
Blue Ledge entitled to the dismissal of Gillmor's adverse possession claim, 
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for Gillmor's failure 
to prosecute? 
Issue II:   Standard Of Review:  Abuse of Discretion 
 
 Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within the broad discretion of 
the trial court.  Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. Utah Dept. of Health, 
851 P.2d 1212 (Utah 1993).  An appellate court will not interfere with that decision 
unless it clearly appears that the trial court has abused its discretion.  Id. at 1214.  
Therefore, the Court of Appeals reviews the district court's ruling for abuse of 
discretion.  Id. 
Preservation of Issues for Review 
 
 The issues were preserved for appeal in the district court in:  (1) Blue 
Ledge's papers filed and oral argument for summary judgment quieting title to 
Blue Ledge in the disputed real property and (2) Blue Ledge's papers filed and oral 
argument to dismiss Gillmor's adverse possession claim for failure to prosecute, 
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pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b), and for entry of final judgment.  (R. 328-355; 
391-412; 440-460; 490-500; 573-583). 
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
 The following Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are determinative in this 
appeal: 
 (1) Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:  Involuntary 
Dismissal; Effect Thereof;  
 (2) Rule 56(a)-(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:  Summary 
Judgment; and 
 (3) Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:  Judgment Upon 
Multiple Claims and/or Involving Multiple Parties. 
 These rules are set forth verbatim in Addendum A hereto.   
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
 
The issue in this quiet title action is whether Gillmor or Blue Ledge owns 
the disputed real property, which is defined as those portions of the surface estate 
of the Woodrow No. 6, Clegg No. 2, and Clegg No. 3 patented mining claims 
(such portions are hereinafter designated as the "Clegg and Woodrow Mining 
Claims" or the "Patented Claims") which are situated in the Northwest Quarter of 
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Section 11, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, SLB&M.  The property at issue 
covers approximately 31 acres.   
Blue Ledge's Record Title 
In the May 22, 1929 patent, the United States conveyed fee title to the Clegg 
Nos. 1-3 and the Woodrow Nos. 1-6 mining claims to Blue Ledge's predecessor in 
interest.  The Patented Claims represent about 31 acres of the approximate 171 
acres included in this patent.  Each mining claim included in the patent is described 
by a metes and bounds description pursuant to Mineral Survey No. 6792.   
On December 20, 1930, the United States issued the homestead patent to the 
predecessor in interest of Gillmor for over 479 acres of land, including the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 11, T2S, R4E, which included the Patented Claims 
already conveyed by the United States to Blue Ledge's predecessor in interest by 
the patent dated May 22, 1929.  The lands included in the homestead patent are 
described by aliquot parts (fractions of sections, such as the "Northwest Quarter of 
Section 11"), rather than by metes and bounds as in the May 22, 1929 patent.  The 
mistake in patenting the Patented Claims twice may have arisen because of these 
differences in descriptions of the same property and the United States Public 
Survey's delayed preparation of a Supplemental Plat depicting the Patented Claims.     
In 1994, Blue Ledge had included the Patented Claims in the proposed 
subdivision plat for the Hidden Meadows Subdivision in Park City, Utah, and was 
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preparing the infrastructure, including roads, curb and gutter, sewer lines, power 
lines, telephone lines, and natural gas lines, on portions of the Patented Claims for 
subdivision development.  At that time, Gillmor filed the instant action to quiet 
title in Gillmor to the Patented Claims, or in the alternative, for a declaratory 
judgment that she owned the Patented Claims by adverse possession.  Although the 
Patented Claims had been surveyed and improved for Blue Ledge's residential 
development purposes, Gillmor's action halted plat approval for this subdivision.  
Blue Ledge counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title to the Patented Claims in Blue 
Ledge.   
The issues in this case are exceedingly simple.  Regarding record title, Blue 
Ledge unquestionably holds paramount record title to the Patented Claims.  As a 
matter of law, once land has been conveyed from the United States to a patentee, 
the United States cannot convey the same land a second time.  After May 22, 1929, 
the United States no longer had title to the Patented Claims and could not convey 
title to Gillmor's predecessor in interest on December 20, 1930.  Consequently, the 
district court on November 8, 2005, granted Blue Ledge's motion for summary 
judgment to quiet title in Blue Ledge to the Patented Claims.   
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Dismissal of Gillmor's Adverse Possession Claim 
As to Gillmor's alternative adverse possession claim, Gillmor failed, for 
thirteen years, to diligently prosecute her adverse possession claim.  In 1996, 
Gillmor withdrew her motion for summary judgment on her adverse possession 
claim, when faced with Blue Ledge's opposition memorandum.  Since that time, 
four judges, at four order to show cause hearings, required her to diligently 
prosecute her claim, but she has failed to do so and has failed to offer any excuse 
for her failure to prosecute.  Consequently, when Blue Ledge filed its motion to 
dismiss Gillmor's adverse possession claim for failure to prosecute, pursuant to 
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court, on December 7, 
2007, dismissed with prejudice Gillmor's adverse possession claim.   
Final Judgment With Property Description 
Finally, when Blue Ledge cited basic hornbook law stating that a final 
judgment in a quiet title action must include a real property description in order to 
identify the parcel of real property and that such property description was a basic 
necessity—not "further relief," the district court entered the Final Judgment in this 
case, with a real property description, quieting title in Blue Ledge to the Patented 
Claims on March 21, 2008.   
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THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT 
 
 The following proceedings in the case are particularly relevant to the district 
court's dismissal of Gillmor's adverse possession claim for her failure to prosecute 
her claim for over thirteen years:  
 1. On or about June 23, 1994, Gillmor filed her complaint in this case, 
alleging record title, or in the alternative, title by adverse possession to the 
Patented Claims and alleging various other claims to property rights against Blue 
Ledge and other defendants.  (District Court Docket (R. Vol. 3); Gillmor 
Complaint (R. 1-9).) 
 2. On or about August 29, 2995, Blue Ledge filed its counterclaim 
quieting title in Blue Ledge to the Patented Claims.  (District Court Docket (R. 
Vol. 3); Blue Ledge Counterclaim (R. 135-152).) 
 3. On or about June 19, 1996, Gillmor filed a motion for summary 
judgment on her adverse possession claim to the Patented Claims.  (District Court 
Docket (R. Vol. 3); Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 240-255).) 
 4. On or about July 17, 1996, Blue Ledge filed its memorandum in 
opposition to Gillmor's motion for summary judgment on the adverse possession 
issue.  (District Court Docket (R. Vol. 3); Defendant Blue Ledge Corporation's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 256-277).) 
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 5. On or about September 20, 1996, Gillmor withdrew her motion for 
summary judgment on her claim of adverse possession to the Patented Claims, 
stating that "additional discovery will be required before trial or renewal of Motion 
for Summary Judgment."  (District Court Docket (R. Vol. 3); Notice of 
Withdrawal of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 281-283).) 
 6. Since Gillmor withdrew her motion for summary judgment on 
September 20, 1996, Gillmor has prepared no discovery, including interrogatories 
or requests for production of documents, and has taken no depositions, in this case.  
(District Court Docket (R. Vol. 3).) 
 7. On December 9, 1997, the district court held an order to show cause 
hearing as to why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.  At the 
December 9, 1997 hearing, Judge Brian stated that the case would be dismissed if 
it was not prosecuted by April 1, 1998.  (District Court Docket Entry (R. Vol. 3).) 
 8. After the December 9, 1997 hearing, Gillmor's attorneys noticed 
depositions, but subsequently cancelled and did not take the depositions.  (District 
Court Docket (R. Vol. 3).) 
 9. On or about November 17, 1999, the district court held a second order 
to show cause hearing as to why this case should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute.  At the November 17, 1999 hearing, Judge Brian stated that the case 
 8
would be dismissed if it was not prosecuted by December 21, 1999.  (District 
Court Docket Entry (R. Vol. 3).) 
 10. After the November 17, 1999 hearing, Gillmor's attorneys again filed 
notices of depositions but subsequently "continued" the depositions "without date."  
(District Court Docket (R. Vol. 3).) 
 11. On or about August 19, 2002, the district court held a third order to 
show cause hearing as to why the case should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute.  At the August 19, 2002 hearing, Judge Hilder ruled that the buyers of 
the Gillmor claim to the Patented Claims had thirty days to file a notice of 
substitution of counsel and a memorandum opposing dismissal.  (District Court 
Docket Entry (R. Vol. 3).) 
 12. On November 19, 2003, the district court held a fourth order to show 
cause hearing as to why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.  
At the November 19, 2003 hearing, Judge Lubeck ruled that an attorney report be 
filed within thirty days or the case "will be definitely dismissed."  (District Court 
Docket Entry (R. Vol. 3).) 
 13. Pursuant to the district court's order, a Stipulated Scheduling Order 
was filed in this case on December 19, 2003, with a fact discovery cutoff date of 
November 30, 2004, and a deadline for dispositive motions of February 27, 2005.  
(District Court Docket (R. Vol. 3); Stipulated Scheduling Order (R. 323-325).) 
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 14. Gillmor's attorneys did not take any discovery, including 
interrogatories, requests for production of documents, or depositions, prior to the 
November 30, 2004 deadline, and Gillmor's attorneys did not file any dispositive 
motions prior to the February 27, 2005 deadline.  (District Court Docket (R. 
Vol. 3).) 
 15. On February 25, 2005, Blue Ledge filed its motion for summary 
judgment to quiet title in Blue Ledge and to establish that Gillmor had failed to 
prove her adverse possession claim.  (District Court Docket (R. Vol. 3); Blue 
Ledge Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment to Quiet Title in Blue Ledge 
Corporation (R. 328-354).) 
 16. After responsive motion papers had been filed and oral argument was 
held on November 7, 2005, the district court issued its written Ruling and Order on 
November 8, 2005, granting Blue Ledge's quiet title claim to the Patented Claims 
as a matter of law but denying summary judgment as to Gillmor's adverse 
possession claim because of factual disputes.  (District Court Docket (R. Vol. 3); 
Ruling and Order (R. 425-439).) 
 17. Gillmor's attorneys made no efforts to prove Gillmor's adverse 
possession claim after the district court's Ruling and Order dated November 8, 
2005.  (District Court Docket (R. Vol. 3).) 
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18. On October 9, 2007, in an attempt to move this case toward 
conclusion, Blue Ledge filed its motion to dismiss Gillmor's adverse possession 
claim for her failure to prosecute.  (District Court Docket (R. Vol. 3); (R. 447-
460).) 
 19. In a Ruling and Order dated December 7, 2007, the district court 
granted Blue Ledge's motion to dismiss with prejudice Gillmor's adverse 
possession claim for Gillmor's failure to prosecute (District Court Docket 
(R. Vol. 3); (R. 544-554).)   
 20. On March 21, 2008, the district court entered a Final Judgment 
quieting title in Blue Ledge to the Patented Claims and included a property 
description of the Patented Claims.  (District Court Docket (R. Vol. 3); (R. 645-
647).) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS  
 
 Blue Ledge disputes Gillmor's characterization of Land Office documents 
(Paragraphs 4-8) and Gillmor's adverse possession allegations (Paragraphs 13-16) 
in Gillmor's Statement of Facts in her Opening Brief.  The United States Land 
Office documents attached to the Affidavit of Rosemary J. Beless (R. 536-540 and 
Ex. A-C) and attached by Gillmor (without foundation) to Gillmor's Reply 
Memorandum (R. 522-525 and Ex. A), speak for themselves.  Gillmor's adverse 
possession allegations, denied by Blue Ledge, are not at issue in this appeal.      
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The district court held there were genuine issues of material fact regarding 
Gillmor's adverse possession claim.  (Ruling and Order dated November 8, 2005; 
R. 425-439.)  The district court subsequently dismissed Gillmor's adverse 
possession claim for her failure to prosecute this claim for over thirteen years.  
(Ruling and Order dated December 7, 2007; R. 544-554.)  Consequently, all of 
these disputed facts in Gillmor's Statement of Facts are irrelevant to the issues on 
appeal in this case.   
 The following facts are relevant to Blue Ledge's ownership of record title to 
the Patented Claims and the district court's granting Blue Ledge's motion for 
summary judgment to quiet title in Blue Ledge to the Patented Claims: 
 1. The real property at issue in this case is those portions of the surface 
estate of Woodrow No. 6, Clegg No. 2, and Clegg No. 3 patented mining claims 
(such portions of the surface estate are hereinafter designated the "Clegg and 
Woodrow Mining Claims" or the "Patented Claims") which are situated in the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 11, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, SLB&M.  
(Counterclaim ¶¶ 10, 11 and 12 (R. 135-152); Gillmor Answer ¶¶ 5 and 6 (R. 153-
162).) 
 2. Fee title to the Patented Claims, including both the surface and 
mineral estates, was conveyed from the United States of America to Charles L. 
Clegg, predecessor in interest of Blue Ledge, by patent dated May 22, 1929 
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(hereinafter the "Blue Ledge 1929 Patent").  (A certified copy of the Blue Ledge 
1929 Patent is attached hereto as Addendum B; (R. 332-352, Ex. C); Counterclaim 
¶ 8 (R. 135-152); Gillmor Answer ¶ 5 (R. 153-162).) 
 3. The United States of America issued a homestead patent, dated 
December 20, 1930, to Johanna A. Clark, predecessor to Gillmor, covering over 
479 acres of land and including the Northwest Quarter of Section 11, Township 2 
South, Range 4 East, SLB&M, Summit County, Utah (the "Gillmor 1930 Patent").  
(A certified copy of the Gillmor 1930 Patent is attached hereto as Addendum C; 
(R. 332-352, Ex. D); Aff. of Nadine Gillmor ("Gillmor Aff.") ¶ 6, June 18, 1996; 
Aff. of Alan Spriggs ¶ 2(a), June 18, 1996 (R. 243-255, Attachments 3 and 1).) 
 4. The Gillmor 1930 Patent included the Patented Claims.  (Gillmor 
Aff., ¶¶ 6 and 7 (R. 243-255, Attachment 3).) 
 5. The Patented Claims, as situated in the Northwest Quarter of 
Section 11, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, SLB&M, are depicted on that 
Supplemental Plat of Section 11, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, SLB&M, 
prepared by the United States Public Survey Office, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
October 31, 1931, accepted by the United States Department of Interior, General 
Land Office, Washington, D.C., November 11, 1931, and recorded with the 
Summit County Recorder, Utah, on August 7, 1935, at Entry No. 55024.  (A 
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certified copy of the Supplemental Plat is attached hereto as Addendum D (R. 332-
352, Ex. E).) 
 6. Gillmor claims ownership of the Patented Claims by virtue of a chain 
of title dating from the Gillmor 1930 Patent.  (Gillmor Aff. ¶¶ 6 and 7 (R. 243-255, 
Attachment 3).)  
7. On July 26, 1929, Charles D. Clegg, patentee of the United States, and 
his wife Martha A. Clegg, grantors, conveyed fee title to the Patented Claims to the 
Silver King Extension Mining Company, grantee, by Mining Deed recorded 
August 1, 1929.  (Certified copy of the Mining Deed at R. 332-352, Ex. F.) 
 8. On March 16, 1973, the Silver King Extension Mining Company, 
grantor, conveyed fee title to the Patented Claims to United Park City Mines 
Company, grantee, by Mining Deed on June 28, 1973.  (Certified copy of the 
Mining Deed at R. 332-352, Ex. G.) 
 9. On May 25, 1995, United Park City Mines Company transferred title 
to the surface estate of the Patented Claims to Blue Ledge, and United Park City 
Mines Company retained the mineral estate, in that Special Warranty Deed 
recorded on June 2, 1995.  (Certified copy of the Special Warranty Deed at R. 332-
352, Ex. H.) 
 10. On August 19, 1982, the Third District Court for Summit County, 
Utah, issued its Judgment, Order and Decree in United Park City Mines Company 
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v. Estate of Clegg, et al., Civil No. 5933, quieting title in United Park City Mines 
Company to the Patented Claims (mineral and surface estates), and said Judgment, 
Order and Decree was recorded on August 24, 1982.  (Certified copy of the 
Judgment, Order and Decree at R. 332-352, Ex. I.) 
 11. In 1987, the Utah Supreme Court confirmed United Park City Mines 
Company's title to the Patented Claims (surface and mineral estate) in United Park 
City Mines Company v. Estate of Clegg, et al., 737 P.2d 173 (Utah 1987).   
 12. In United Park City Mines Company v. Estate of Clegg, et al., 737 
P.2d 173 (Utah 1987), Gillmor's husband, Frank Gillmor, was a witness and 
evidence was presented that the Gillmor family members were previously lessees 
of the surface estate of the Patented Claims, but no claim to title to the Patented 
Claims was made by any of the Gillmors in that case.  737 P.2d at 175. 
 13. On November 8, 2005, the district court granted Blue Ledge's motion 
for summary judgment to quiet title in Blue Ledge to the Patented Claims.  
(R. 425-439.) 
 14. On December 7, 2007, the district court granted Blue Ledge's motion 
to dismiss with prejudice Gillmor's adverse possession claim to the Patented 
Claims for Gillmor's failure to prosecute her adverse possession claim for over 
thirteen years.  (R. 544-554.) 
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 15. On March 21, 2008, the district court entered the Final Judgment 
quieting title in Blue Ledge to the Patented Claims and including a real property 
description of the Patented Claims.  (R. 645-647.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Gillmor is trying to complicate and confuse a very simple matter:  the United 
States conveyed fee title to the Patented Claims to the predecessor-in-interest of 
Blue Ledge on May 22, 1929.  That this May 22, 1929 Patent conveyed fee title 
(surface and mineral estates) to the land is a simple matter of law which can be 
ascertained from the patent itself.  After May 22, 1929, the United States no longer 
had title to the Patented Claims and could not convey title to Gillmor's 
predecessor-in-interest on December 20, 1930.  All of Gillmor's "red-herring" 
arguments, including surface use limitations for unpatented mining claims, 
unsupported tales of what "might have happened" at the Land Office, and a six-
year statute of limitations for the United States, are simply inapplicable.   
Gillmor's adverse possession claim was dismissed for her failure to 
prosecute her claim for over thirteen years and her failure to provide any 
reasonable excuse or good cause for her failure to prosecute.  Moreover, while 
Gillmor's adverse possession claim was pending in the district court for over 
thirteen years, Blue Ledge was precluded from developing the Patented Claims on 
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which it had spent time and money constructing the infrastructure for a residential 
subdivision.   
Finally, Blue Ledge moved for entry of a final judgment in this case as soon 
as Gillmor's adverse possession claim had been dismissed.  Furthermore, a real 
property description in a final judgment to quiet title in real property is a basic 
necessity—not a matter for which a party must request "further" or "affirmative 
relief." 
ARGUMENT 
I.  BLUE LEDGE HAS SATISFIED ITS BURDEN OF PROOF TO 
QUIET TITLE TO THE PATENTED CLAIMS IN BLUE LEDGE. 
 
 In order to succeed in an action to quiet title, a party must "prevail on the 
strength of his own claim to title and not on the defendant's weakness of title."  
Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 87 P.3d 734, 740 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).  
Where both parties claim ownership through different chains of title, each party 
must assume the burden of establishing its title by competent evidence.  Dunlap v. 
Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 76 P.3d 711, 713 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).  If, 
as in the instant case, a party can make a prima facie showing of title, the burden is 
on the opposing party to controvert the evidence of title.  Babock v. Dangerfield, 
94 P.2d 862, 863 (Utah 1939).   
 In Blue Ledge's motion for summary judgment to quiet title in Blue Ledge to 
the Patented Claims, Blue Ledge included a certified copy of the Blue Ledge 1929 
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Patent, granting Blue Ledge's predecessor-in-interest, fee simple title to the 
Patented Claims, including the surface and mineral estates.  The chain of title to 
the Patented Claims was then traced, by attached certified copies of deeds, to 
United Park City Mines Company, and then by a deed to the surface estate to Blue 
Ledge.  (R. 332-352, Ex. C, F, G & H).  Thus, Blue Ledge clearly demonstrated an 
unbroken chain of title dating from the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent.   
Because the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent was issued prior to the Gillmor 1930 
Patent, Blue Ledge has satisfied its burden to show its record title to the Patented 
Claims.  In issuing the Gillmor 1930 Patent, dated December 20, 1930, the United 
States could not convey away rights which it no longer held in the Patented 
Claims, and the Gillmor 1930 Patent could not cut off previously existing vested 
rights held by the owner of the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent.  See Montgomery v. 
Gerlinger, 304 P.2d 93, 95-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); People v. Dorr, 157 P.2d 859, 
861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945); Ames v. Empire Star Mines Co., Ltd., 110 P.2d 13, 17 
(Cal. 1941); Brown v. Luddy, 9 P.2d 326, 331 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932) ("A patent of 
the government cannot, any more than a deed of an individual, transfer what the 
grantor does not possess.").   
By demonstrating its paramount record title to the Patented Claims, Blue 
Ledge satisfied its burden of proof to quiet title in Blue Ledge to the Patented 
Claims.  Title is a matter of the plain language in the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent.  It is 
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a question of law; there are no issues of fact.  Moreover, Blue Ledge need not 
speculate as to why the United States made a clerical error in issuing the Gillmor 
1930 Patent after it had issued the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent for the Patented Claims.  
Such speculation is irrelevant and pointless.  Blue Ledge need only provide 
certified copies of its 1929 Patent and an unbroken chain of deeds to Blue Ledge in 
order to satisfy its burden of proof to quiet title in Blue Ledge to the Patented 
Claims.   
II. FEE TITLE TO THE PATENTED CLAIMS WAS CONVEYED 
FROM THE UNITED STATES TO BLUE LEDGE'S PREDECESSOR 
ON MAY 22, 1929. 
 
 While Gillmor disputes that the surface estate of the Patented Claims was 
conveyed to Blue Ledge's predecessor by the May 22, 1929 Patent, Gillmor 
provides no legal basis in the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent for this dispute.1  That the 
Blue Ledge 1929 Patent conveyed fee title (surface and mineral estates) to the 
Patented Claims is a simple matter of law which can be ascertained from the patent 
itself. 
 It is basic hornbook law that a mining claim patent includes the surface 
estate, as well as the mineral estate, unless the patent contains a reservation 
                                                 
1 Instead, Gillmor argues, by reverse logic, that because the Gillmor 1930 Patent was a 
Stock-Raising Homestead Act patent (which, by statute, must reserve all minerals to the 
United States), then the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent must not have included the surface estate 
to the Patented Claims.  Gillmor Opening Brief at 14-15.  However, the Blue Ledge 1929 
Patent obviously was issued before the Gillmor 1930 Patent and the Blue Ledge 1929 
Patent includes the surface estate. 
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excluding the surface estate.  St. Louis Mining & Milling Company of Montana v. 
Montana Mining Co., 194 U.S. 235, 237 (1904); Deffebach v. Hawke, 115 U.S. 
392, 406 (1885); Empire State-Idaho Mining & Developing Co. v. Bunker Hill & 
Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 114 F. 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1902); Superior 
Co. v. Musselshell County, 41 P.2d 14 (Mont. 1935); Hinz v. Musselshell Co., 267 
P. 1113, 1116 (Mont. 1928).   
 A review of the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent reveals that the only reservations 
and exceptions in the patent are for:  (1) any vested or accrued water rights; (2) a 
right-of-way for ditches and canals constructed by the authority of the United 
States; (3) easements, drainage and other means to complete development as 
provided by the Utah Legislature; and (4) certain rights for transmission line 
purposes for Utah Power & Light Company.  There is no reservation or exception 
made for the surface estate.   
 Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court confirmed the fee title (both surface 
and mineral estates) in Blue Ledge's predecessor to all of the Clegg Nos. 1-3 and 
Woodrow Nos. 1-6 patented claims, including the Patented Claims, under this 
same Blue Ledge 1929 Patent, in United Park City Mines Company v. Estate of 
Clegg, 737 P.2d 173 (Utah 1987).  Indeed, the decision in that case, in which 
Gillmor's husband was a witness, is admitted by Gillmor.  (Gillmor's Response to 
Blue Ledge's Statement of Facts ¶¶ 13 and 14; R. 362.)   
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 Finally, even the legal memoranda (Affidavit of H. James Clegg and 
attached legal memoranda) attached to Gillmor's April 1, 2005 Opposition 
Memorandum (R. 358-383, Attachment 4), state that the surface estate is included 
in the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent to the Patented Claims.  Indeed, Gillmor has 
presented no language in the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent or any applicable case law to 
dispute the legal conclusion that the surface estate to the Patented Claims is 
included in the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent.   
 Since the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent conveyed fee simple title (including the 
surface and mineral estates) to Blue Ledge's predecessor-in-interest, and there is no 
dispute in the chain of title from this predecessor to Blue Ledge, Blue Ledge holds 
record title to the Patented Claims.  It simply does not matter how many 
subsequent patents the United States issued to the Patented Claims after the Blue 
Ledge 1929 Patent because the United States had divested itself of title to the 
Patented Claims and had no title to convey in subsequent patents.   
III.  THE UNITED STATES DID NOT HAVE TITLE TO THE 
PATENTED CLAIMS AT THE TIME OF THE GILLMOR 1930 
PATENT.  
 
 Because the United States conveyed fee title in the Patented Claims to Blue 
Ledge in the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent, the United States had no interest in the 
Patented Claims to convey to Gillmor’s predecessor in the Gillmor 1930 Patent.  
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Consequently, no title to the Patented Claims passed under the Gillmor 1930 
Patent. 
 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when land has 
previously been patented by the United States, then a subsequent patent by the 
United States is void.  St. Louis Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 640-645 
(1881); Proctor v. Painter, 15 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1926) (citing a lengthy list of 
United States Supreme Court cases on this point). 
 Like any other conveyance, once land has been transferred by the United 
States, it is beyond the authority of the Land Department to transfer it again.  St. 
Louis Smelting, 104 U.S. at 641.  When the land is already patented, the Land 
Department has no authority to act, and no authority exists to patent the same land 
a second time.  Id. at 646-647.  After the first patent is issued, “the United States 
has no interest left to grant.”  Francoeur v. Newhouse, 40 F. 618, 623 (C.C. Cal. 
1889); Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Cannon, 54 F. 252, 258 (C.C. Dist. Mont. 1893); 
Jorgensen v. McAllister, 202 P. 1059 (Idaho 1921); West v. Minneapolis Mining & 
Smelting Co., 217 P. 342, 343 (Mont. 1923) (“where land is not owned by the 
United States, . . . the land officials are without jurisdiction to dispose of it, and if, 
in defiance of law, a patent issues to it, the same is ineffectual to pass title and is 
void from the beginning, and in such case may be assailed in an action of law, and 
like a void judgment, may be attacked collaterally”).  Upon issuance of a patent, 
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the land becomes private property, subject to the same rules of private ownership 
prescribed by the laws of the state.  West v. Minneapolis, 217 P. at 344 (citing 
Lindley on Mines § 22).2 
Because the United States did not hold title to the Patented Claims at the 
time of the Gillmor 1930 Patent, title to the Patented Claims did not pass to the 
patentee under the Gillmor 1930 Patent.3   
                                                 
2 Although Gillmor argues for the "strong presumption" of the validity of a patent 
from the United States (Opening Brief at 10-11), Gillmor does not cite a case for 
the presumption of validity of a subsequent patent when the United States has 
already transferred title in a previous patent, nor could she, because such 
proposition is contrary to law. 
 
3 Blue Ledge is not "seeking . . . annulment "of the Gillmor 1930 Patent, as argued by 
Gillmor in her Opening Brief.  (Opening Brief at 21.)  The Gillmor 1930 Patent is not 
voidable, but void ab initio (void from its issuance), since the United States had no 
interest left in the Patented Claims to transfer in the Gillmor 1930 Patent.   
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IV. 43 U.S.C. § 1166 IS INAPPLICABLE BECAUSE THE UNITED 
STATES DID NOT HAVE TITLE TO THE PATENTED CLAIMS AT 
THE TIME OF THE GILLMOR 1930 PATENT.      
 
 It is clear from all of the cases regarding the application of 43 U.S.C. § 1166 
(the "1891 Statute of Limitations"), including the cases cited by Gillmor,4 that this 
statute only applies when the United States has title to the property to be conveyed 
to the patentee at the time of the patent.  The purpose of the 1891 Statute of  
Limitations is to secure and provide marketable title to the patentee six years after 
issuance of the patent and protect the patent from rescission by the government for 
various procedural irregularities, withdrawals, or reclassifications.  United States v. 
Eaton Shale Co., 433 F. Supp. 1256, 1268 (D. Colo. 1977).  However, the 1891 
                                                 
4 In the cases cited by Gillmor, the United States had title at the time of patent and 
conveyed title under the patent to the patentee.  Therefore, the 1891 Statute of 
Limitations protected the patentee from rescission of the patent for various procedural 
irregularities, such as the government’s reclassification or withdrawal of lands from 
public entry or sale.  See Wollan v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 997 F. Supp. 1397 
(D. Colo. 1998) (the federal government did convey the land by patent and Wollan 
argued the patent should not have been issued because of his claims); State of Alaska v. 
The First National Bank of Anchorage, 689 P.2d 483 (Alaska 1984) (the federal 
government did convey title to the land by the patent and Alaska argued the patent should 
not have issued because of prior withdrawals); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water 
Power Co., 209 U.S. 447 (1908) (the United States conveyed title to two islands by the 
patent and the United States wanted to rescind the patent by claiming the patent should 
not have been issued because the land was reserved for public purposes); State of 
Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70 (1908) (unresolved issues as to whether a patent was 
issued for swamp lands and whether the statute barred such rescission).  
 
Furthermore, Blue Ledge does not "stand in the shoes" of the United States, nor is Blue 
Ledge a successor to the United States as the original grantor of the land.  In contrast, 
Wollan "stood in the shoes" of the United States and was a successor-in-interest of the 
United States because he wanted the patent invalidated so that the land would be returned 
to the United States.  Wollan, 997 F.Supp. at 1398. 
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Statute of Limitations cannot create title to a patentee when the United States had 
no title to convey at the time of the patent.  United States v. Winona & St. P.R. Co., 
165 U.S. 463 (1897); Northern P.R. Co. v. United States, 227 U.S. 355 (1913). 
 In United States v. Chandler-Dunbar, 209 U.S. at 450, a case cited by 
Gillmor, Mr. Justice Holmes begins his discussion of the applicability of the 1891 
Statute of Limitations by stating that the land must belong to the United States at 
the time of patent in order for the statute to apply:  “This land, whether reserved or 
not, was public land of the United States, and in kind open to sale and conveyance 
through the Land Department.”  Justice Holmes also cites the earlier case of United 
States v. Winona & St. T.R. Co., 165 U.S. at 476, where Mr. Justice Brewer sets 
forth the limitation on the application of the 1891 Statute of Limitations: 
[T]he act of 1891 . . . provided that suits to vacate and annul patents 
. . . should only be brought within six years after the date of issue.  
Under the benign influence of this statute, it would not matter what 
the mistake or error of the lands department was, what the frauds and 
misrepresentations of the patentee were, the patent would become 
conclusive as a transfer of the title, providing only that the land was  
public land of the United States, and open to sale and conveyance 
through the land department. 
 
165 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added). 
 Likewise, in 1913 the United States Supreme Court held the 1891 Statute of 
Limitations was not available in a suit brought by the United States to annul 
patents issued in the mistaken belief that the land was owned by the United States  
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at the time of the patent, when it was not.  Northern P.R. Co. v. United States, 227 
U.S. at 374.  When the land was owned by the Yakima Indians, not by the United 
States, at the time of patent, the 1891 Statute of Limitations did not protect title 
under the patent from rescission.  Id.   
 In addressing the issue of whether the 1891 Statute of Limitations can secure 
title in a patent when the United States had no title at the time of patent, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court stated: 
The prerequisite to the effectiveness of the statute of limitations in the 
federal act is a patent issued on lands which the United States has 
power to dispose of under Acts of Congress or the Constitution.  A 
judicial act purporting to alienate that which was inalienable was, 
because of the very fact of the inalienability, incapable of being 
validated because it was more than merely invalid.  It was in effect an 
act transferring nothing and creating nothing. . . . Thus, lands which 
were inalienable . . . could not be acquired by a mere statute of 
limitations for there was no title to transfer in the beginning. 
 
Gulf Oil Corporation v. State Mineral Board, 317 So.2d 576, 588 (La. 1975). 
 In the instant case, the United States conveyed the Patented Claims to Blue 
Ledge’s predecessor in the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent, so there was no title to the 
Patented Claims for the United States to transfer to Gillmor’s predecessor in the 
Gillmor 1930 Patent.  Since the 1891 Statute of Limitations cannot create title 
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when there was none to be transferred, the 1891 Statute of Limitations is not 
applicable.5 
 The district court put Gillmor’s 1891 Statute of Limitations argument to rest 
in its decision quieting title to the Patented Claims in Blue Ledge: 
The 1929 patent makes any further attempt at conveyance, or any later 
patents of the same or different kinds, void ab initio.  The statute of 
limitations applies only to the United States or it successors, and is not 
applicable here.  A collateral attack on the homestead patent is 
allowed by defendant.  The court sees nothing but a legal dispute 
about the effect of these 1929 and 1930 patents.   
 
Ruling and Order at 10-11 (R. 425-439). 
V. THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD AND THE BASIC TENETS OF 
MINING LAW SUPPORT BLUE LEDGE'S TITLE TO THE 
PATENTED CLAIMS. 
 
 Gillmor has selected portions of Land Office documents and quotations 
regarding unpatented mining claims in an attempt to confuse and complicate the 
simple issues in this case.   
 In a desperate effort before the district court, Gillmor attached, without any 
foundation, a copy of the Second Amended Protest in Contest No. 4781 filed by 
C.D. Clegg (predecessor of Blue Ledge) against the homestead entry of Johanna A. 
                                                 
5 Gillmor does not explain how the 1891 Statute of Limitations could apply in the 
instant case.  The court could not simply "validate" the Gillmor 1930 Patent, since 
the United States does not have title to the Patented Claims to transfer to Gillmor.  
The United States would have to take title to the Patented Claims away from Blue 
Ledge before it could transfer title to Gillmor.  The United States has no reason to 
do this.  
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Clark (predecessor to Gillmor) and stated that "the Government issued the patent to 
Clark after considering and rejecting Clegg's protest."  Gillmor's Reply 
Memorandum at 3 (R. 523).  This statement, and paraphrases of this statement 
throughout Gillmor's Reply Memorandum, are absolutely false.   
 As shown in the documents obtained from the National Archives and 
attached to the Affidavit of Rosemary J. Beless (R. 536-541, Ex. A-C), the 
decision of the Department of Interior, dated January 21, 1927, and the decision of 
the Commissioner of the General Land Office, dated January 17, 1928, state that 
the Johanna A. Clark homestead entry should be cancelled as to the land 
conflicting with the Clegg Nos. 2 and 3 and the Woodrow No. 6 claims (the 
"Patented Claims") in conformance with the C.D. Clegg Amended Protest.  
Gillmor simply failed to include the decisions on this Contest in her Reply 
Memorandum.  These decisions support Blue Ledge's title to the Patented Claims, 
not Gillmor's creative tale.   
 Now, in her Opening Brief, Gillmor makes up her own fairytale without any 
reference to the administrative record.  Although the Land Office cancelled the 
Clark homestead entry as to land conflicting with the Patented Claims, Gillmor 
states that the Land Office "plainly determined to grant Ms. Clark all of the surface 
rights" and then the "United States saw fit to grant those mineral rights to 
Mr. Clegg."  Opening Brief at 15.  Gillmor, it seems, conveniently forgets that the 
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Blue Ledge 1929 Patent for fee title to the Patented Claims was issued before the 
Gillmor 1930 Patent.  Moreover, Blue Ledge could not have previously "refuted" 
Gillmor's fairytale because (1) Gillmor just created it in her Opening Brief; (2) 
Gillmor has not one shred of evidence to support her fairytale; and (3) Gillmor's 
fairytale disregards the language in the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent and all of the 
patent law in the Mining Law of 1872.   
 Gillmor spins another tale in her Opening Brief by stating that perhaps 
Gillmor's predecessor's date of entry upon the land was prior to the date of Blue 
Ledge's predecessor.  Opening Brief at 18.  However, from that Second Amended 
Protest in Contest No. 4781 which Gillmor attached to her Reply Memorandum 
(R. 522-526, Ex. A) before the district court, Gillmor knows that Blue Ledge's 
predecessor located its claims in 1914 and 1916 and Gillmor's predecessor filed her 
homestead entry in 1917.   
 Gillmor then goes on to quote contemporary cases dealing with unpatented 
mining claims (Gillmor Opening Brief at 19, n. 4, citing U.S. v. Good, 257 
F.Supp.2d 1306 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Col. 2003) and U.S. v. Etcheverry, 230 F.2d 193 
(9th Cir. 1956)).  Indeed, certain unpatented mining claims do have surface uses 
limited to mining and related purposes, but we are not dealing with any unpatented 
mining claims in this case.  The Patented Claims were patented in 1929.  
Therefore, Gillmor's argument regarding the use of the surface estate of unpatented 
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mining claims is totally irrelevant.  As stated in Section II above, a mining claim 
patent automatically includes the surface estate, as well as the mineral estate, 
unless the patent contains a reservation excluding the surface estate.  There is no 
such reservation in the Blue Ledge 1929 Patent.   
VI. GILLMOR HAS FAILED TO DILIGENTLY PROSECUTE HER 
ADVERSE POSSESSION CLAIM. 
 
 In her Opening Brief, Gillmor makes much of Blue Ledge's supposed 
motivation for filing its Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss Gillmor's adverse possession 
claim.  Actually, Blue Ledge's motivation was simple:  Blue Ledge had spent 
considerable time and money preparing the Patented Claims for development, but 
Blue Ledge had been prevented from platting and selling the Patented Claims 
because Gillmor's adverse possession claim had been pending against the Patented 
Claims for thirteen years.   
Blue Ledge prosecuted its counterclaim, quieting Blue Ledge's record title to 
the Patented Claims, to a successful conclusion in Blue Ledge's motion for 
summary judgment which the district court granted on November 8, 2005.  
However, Blue Ledge had no duty to prosecute Gillmor's adverse possession claim.  
Notably, even in her Opening Brief, Gillmor offers no facts in regard to a 
compelling reason why she did not prosecute her adverse possession claim for 
thirteen years. 
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 Indeed, Gillmor has never offered any excuse, much less a compelling 
reason or good cause, for her failure to diligently prosecute her adverse possession 
claim for thirteen years.6  Gillmor's only argument is that Blue Ledge should not 
have filed its Rule 41(b) motion because Gillmor made a settlement proposal 
(which Blue Ledge rejected September 27, 2007) to which Gillmor attached a copy 
of her draft motion for reconsideration of the district court's November 8, 2005 
decision quieting title in Blue Ledge to the Patented Claims.  Gillmor's draft 
motion was evidently attached to her settlement proposal in order to convince Blue 
Ledge to pay Gillmor to dismiss her adverse possession claim, even though 
Gillmor's draft motion to reconsider did not attempt to prosecute Gillmor's adverse 
possession claim.  Indeed, Gillmor's attachment of only a draft motion to 
reconsider, without any motion regarding Gillmor's adverse possession claim, 
implied that she was not prosecuting her adverse possession claim.   
A. Gillmor Has Offered No Excuse for Her Failure to Prosecute Her 
Adverse Possession Claim for Thirteen Years. 
 
 The burden is upon the party attacking a Rule 41(b) dismissal, to offer a 
reasonable excuse for that party's lack of diligence.  Country Meadows 
Convalescent Center v. Utah Dept. of Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1215 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1993).  In Country Meadows, plaintiff's claim was dismissed when the plaintiff 
                                                 
6 In a review of Utah Rule 41(b) cases, Blue Ledge has not found another example of a 
lawsuit that languished as long as thirteen years.  Cases were dismissed for failure to 
prosecute after two years, four years, seven years, or, at most, eight years.   
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"failed to offer any persuasive or legitimate reason for failing to take steps to 
advance its petition for over five years."  Id. at 1216.  Gillmor has offered no 
excuse for her failure to prosecute her adverse possession claim for thirteen years. 
 The Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trial court has discretion to 
dismiss a case under Rule 41(b) when a party neglects to prosecute "without 
justifiable excuse."  Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1215, quoting Westinghouse 
Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 
1975).  "Such non-action is inexcusable, not only from the standpoint of the 
parties, but because it constitutes abuse of the judicial process."  Maxfield v. 
Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 240-41 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 789 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1989).   
 In Meadow Fresh Farms, the court explained that allowing protracted 
litigation, without good cause or a reasonable excuse for plaintiff's lack of 
diligence, causes serious problems in securing witnesses and addressing allegations 
after a long passage of time.  Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State Univ., 813 
P.2d 1216, 1220 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991).  The court noted that "the underlying events 
relating to this action occurred nearly a decade ago, in 1981. . . . After ten years, it 
is reasonable to assume the facts are stale.  Many of the potential witnesses have 
moved out of state and/or their recollection of the circumstances and events may 
have dimmed."  Id.  The Meadow Fresh case was dismissed, for failure to 
 32
prosecute, in 1990.  Id. at 1217.  The instant case, with underlying events also 
occurring in the early 1980's, was still pending in 2007.  Gillmor's adverse 
possession claim, which is extremely fact-sensitive and relates to a period of time 
in the early 1980's, had languished for thirteen years while facts had become 
extremely stale and witnesses' recollections dim regarding events that occurred 
around twenty-seven years ago.  With no justification from Gillmor, such delay in 
prosecution is a serious abuse of the judicial process—to the detriment of Blue 
Ledge. 
 B. Gillmor's Adverse Possession Claim Is Appropriate for Dismissal. 
 In addition to considering the length of time a case has been pending, the 
Utah Supreme Court has used five factors to assist the courts in assessing the 
sufficiency of a proffered excuse for a plaintiff's failure to prosecute with due 
diligence.  These five factors include:   
  (1) The conduct of both parties; 
  (2) The opportunity each party has had to move the case forward; 
  (3)  What each party has done to move the case forward; 
(4) The amount of difficulty or prejudice that may have been 
caused to the other side; and 
(5) "Most important," whether injustice may result from the 
dismissal. 
 
Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1215; Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State 
Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) quoting Westinghouse Electric 
Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975).  
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The facts in this case clearly demonstrate that the five factors have been met for the 
dismissal of this case for Gillmor's failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b).   
 First, as to the conduct of the parties, Gillmor has engaged in no discovery 
since all of her claims, except her claim to title to the Patented Claims, were settled 
in 1996.7  Gillmor filed a motion for summary judgment on her adverse possession 
claim on or about June 19, 1996.  However, after Blue Ledge filed its opposition 
memorandum on July 17, 1996, Gillmor withdrew her motion for summary 
judgment on her adverse possession claim on September 20, 1996, stating that 
"additional discovery will be required before trial or renewal of Motion for 
Summary Judgment."  After Gillmor withdrew her motion for summary judgment 
on her adverse possession claim on September 20, 1996, Gillmor has taken no 
discovery, including interrogatories, requests for production, or depositions, in this 
case.   
 Even after Gillmor was ordered at four different order to show cause 
hearings to prosecute her claim or face dismissal, she has failed to prosecute her 
remaining adverse possession claim.  Gillmor's counsel has repeatedly filed notices 
of depositions, pursuant to an order of the judge at two of the four order to show 
cause hearings, and then cancelled the depositions at a later date.     
                                                 
7 Prior to that settlement, Gillmor prepared one set of preliminary interrogatories, on all of 
her claims, which was filed September 18, 1995.   
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 Second, Gillmor has had every conceivable opportunity to move this case 
forward.  At four different order to show cause hearings, the judge agreed to give  
her one more opportunity to prosecute her claim.  Yet, each time she has failed to 
prosecute with due diligence.  After the order to show cause hearings on 
December 9, 1997, and November 17, 1999, Gillmor's attorneys filed notices of 
depositions, but no depositions were ever taken.  After the November 19, 2003, 
order to show cause hearing, a Stipulated Scheduling Order was filed on 
December 19, 2003, but Gillmor failed to take any discovery before the discovery 
cutoff date of November 30, 2004, and failed to file any dispositive motions before  
the dispositive deadline of February 27, 2005.  In the district court's Ruling and  
Order entered November 8, 2005, granting Blue Ledge's motion for summary 
judgment to quiet title in Blue Ledge, the court determined that Gillmor had 
created factual disputes as to her claim of adverse possession which would 
preclude summary judgment on that claim.  The court, however, stated "plaintiff's 
affidavit leaves something to be desired as far as the degree of knowledge about 
other use."  Nevertheless, Gillmor did not prosecute her claim after that 
November 8, 2005 Ruling and Order.   
 Third, Gillmor has done nothing to move her claim forward since she 
withdrew her motion for summary judgment on her adverse possession claim in 
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1996.  In contrast, although Blue Ledge has no duty to prosecute Gillmor's claim 
with diligence, Blue Ledge filed its own motion for summary judgment to quiet  
title to the Patented Claims in Blue Ledge, pursuant to the Stipulated Scheduling 
Order, on February 25, 2005.  Blue Ledge also moved for summary judgment 
declaring that Gillmor had failed to prove her adverse possession claim.  In the 
district court's Ruling and Order dated November 8, 2005, the court granted Blue 
Ledge's motion for summary judgment to quiet title to the Patented Claims in Blue 
Ledge.  While the court stated there were disputes of fact as to Gillmor's adverse 
possession claim which precluded summary judgment, Gillmor did not pursue her 
claim after the Ruling and Order.   
 Fourth, the pendency of Gillmor's adverse possession claim for thirteen 
years has caused a great amount of difficulty and prejudice to Blue Ledge.  Gillmor 
filed her adverse possession against Blue Ledge on June 23, 1994, just as Blue 
Ledge was preparing the Patented Claims for subdivision approval and 
development.  Although Gillmor has been aware that she has prevented Blue 
Ledge from developing the Patented Claims for thirteen years, Gillmor did nothing 
to prosecute her claim.  Indeed, at one point in the lawsuit, Gillmor transferred her 
claim of adverse possession to another party.  In contrast, Blue Ledge has 
expended a great deal of money preparing the Patented Claims for development 
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and has been prevented from developing the Patented Claims because of the 
continued pendency of Gillmor's action.   
 Fifth, no injustice would result from this dismissal because Blue Ledge 
holds record title to the Patented Claims and Gillmor has failed to present any 
compelling facts as to her adverse possession claim in thirteen years.  Blue Ledge 
had spent money in development of the Patented Claims but had not been able to 
reap any economic benefit from development or marketing of the Patented Claims 
because of the pendency of this action for thirteen years.  Dismissal of this case 
would prevent further injustice from occurring.   
C. It Is Gillmor's Duty To Diligently Prosecute Her Adverse 
Possession Claim. 
 
Contrary to Gillmor's argument, the parties do not have an equal obligation 
to prosecute Gillmor's adverse possession claim.  Adverse possession is Gillmor's 
claim.  Blue Ledge's counterclaim to quiet title to Blue Ledge in the Patented 
Claims had been successfully resolved, following Blue Ledge's motion for 
summary judgment, in the district court's November 8, 2005 decision.   
The Utah courts have repeatedly held that "the duty to prosecute is a duty of 
due diligence imposed on the plaintiff, not on a defendant."  Country Meadows, 
851 P.2d at 1216.  Blue Ledge completed the prosecution of its counterclaim in 
2005, and Blue Ledge had no duty to prosecute Gillmor's claim for adverse 
possession.  Consequently, the cases that Gillmor cites for the proposition that  
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Blue Ledge should have taken the initiative to prosecute Gillmor's adverse 
possession claim are inapposite.8 
D. Gillmor's Certificate for Readiness for Trial, Filed After Blue 
Ledge's Motion To Dismiss, Does Not Preclude Dismissal. 
 
Throughout the long history of this case, Gillmor's method of operation has 
always been the same.  She waits until she is threatened with dismissal of her 
claim, and then she files a document to prevent immediate dismissal and prolong 
the already-protracted litigation.  For example, after the order to show cause 
hearings on December 9, 1997, and November 17, 1999, Gillmor's attorneys filed 
notices of depositions, but no depositions were ever taken.  After the 
November 19, 2003 order to show cause hearing, a Stipulated Scheduling Order 
was filed on December 19, 2003, but Gillmor failed to take any discovery or file 
any dispositive motions prior to the deadlines in the order.   
Finally, only after the Rule 41(b) motion was filed to dismiss Gillmor's 
adverse possession claim for her failure to prosecute for thirteen years, did Gillmor  
                                                 
8 Neither Crystal Lime nor Firebrand is applicable in the instant case.  In Crystal Lime & 
Cement Co. v. Robbins, 335 P.2d 624 (Utah 1959), the court had already reached a 
judgment on the merits of the case, but neither side prepared findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and a decree for a period of four years, when either side could have done so.  
Since a judgment had been reached in this case on both plaintiff's and defendant's claims, 
this case is inapplicable to the instant case.  See 335 P.2d at 625.  In Firebrand, neither 
party had an active interest in the case but a change of counsel evidently caused a four-
year delay in plaintiff's obtaining a default judgment against the defendants.  Johnson v. 
Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368, 1369 (Utah 1977).  In contrast to the lack of any activity 
in Firebrand, Blue Ledge has pursued its claim to a resolution. 
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file her Certificate for Readiness for Trial on October 24, 2007.  The fact that after 
thirteen years Gillmor has filed her Certificate for Readiness for Trial, about two 
weeks after receiving Blue Ledge's motion to dismiss her claim for failure to 
prosecute, did not preclude the district court's granting Blue Ledge's Rule 41(b) 
motion.  See Maxfield v. Fishler, 538 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1975) (plaintiff's 
claim dismissed on the first day of trial for failure to prosecute); Maxfield v. 
Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (plaintiff's action dismissed at 
pretrial hearing for failure to timely prosecute); Charlie Brown Construction Co., 
Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (the court 
ordered the matter dismissed at the pretrial conference for failure to prosecute); 
Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1216 (plaintiff's claim dismissed when plaintiff 
made no attempt to reactivate the case until after the dismissal motion). 
It would be a travesty of justice to allow Gillmor to resurrect this moribund 
case where facts are stale and witnesses' memories are dimmed, by merely filing a 
Certificate for Readiness for Trial.  See Meadow Fresh Farms, 813 P.2d at 1220 
(plaintiff's claim was dismissed for failure to prosecute where "[d]efendants in this 
case are prejudiced by the passage of time"). 
E. A Final Judgment Could Not Have Been Entered Until After the 
Adverse Possession Claim Was Dismissed on December 7, 2007. 
 
Gillmor argues that Blue Ledge was dilatory in not moving for entry of final 
judgment quieting title to the Patented Claims, with a real property description, at  
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the time of the November 8, 2005 Ruling and Order confirming Blue Ledge's 
record title to the Patented Claims.  However, the issue of Gillmor's alleged 
adverse possession of Blue Ledge's Patented Claims was still outstanding on 
November 8, 2005.   
It is basic hornbook law that a final judgment may not be entered until all of 
the issues in the case have been decided.  This is particularly true with two related 
issues, such as record title and potential loss of record title through adverse 
possession.  Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expressly states that a 
final judgment cannot be entered until all of the claims of the parties have been 
determined:   
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple 
parties.  When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct 
the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of 
the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the court 
that there is no just reason for delay and upon express direction for the 
entry of judgment.  In the absence of such determination in any 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all of the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of 
the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject 
to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all 
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.   
 
Rule 54(b) (emphasis added). 
 Therefore, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Blue Ledge could not have moved for 
entry of final judgment until Gillmor's adverse possession claim was dismissed.  
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Indeed, in Blue Ledge's motion to dismiss Gillmor's adverse possession claim, 
filed October 9, 2007, Blue Ledge also moves for entry of final judgment pursuant 
to Rule 54(b), stating:   
With dismissal of Gillmor's adverse possession claim, this Court 
should enter final judgment in this case by operation of law and 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) because all claims in this case will have been 
finally adjudicated and there is no reason to delay entry of final 
judgment.   
 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Blue Ledge Corporation's Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff's Adverse Possession Claim for Failure to Prosecute Pursuant to 
Rule 41(b) and for Entry of Final Judgment at 12 (R. 458). 
 It was not until after the district court dismissed Gillmor's adverse 
possession claim, on December 7, 2007, that the entry of a final judgment in this 
case, incorporating the November 8, 2005 record title decision and the 
December 7, 2007 adverse possession decision, with a property description of the 
Patented Claims, could have been entered.   
F. In a Quiet Title Action, a Final Judgment Incorporating a 
Property Description Is Not "Further Relief" or "Affirmative 
Relief." 
 
A description of the "Patented Claims" in a final judgment, incorporating the 
district court's decisions of November 8, 2005, and December 7, 2007, is not 
"further relief" or "affirmative relief," as Gillmor argues, it is simply a requirement  
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at the conclusion of a quiet title case.  After Blue Ledge had prevailed on its claim 
to record title to the Patented Claims and the district court had dismissed Gillmor's 
adverse possession claim to the Patented Claims, it was appropriate that a final 
judgment be entered with a property description of the Patented Claims which 
could be recorded.  
A property description is not "affirmative relief" in a final judgment or 
decree to quiet title, it is a basic necessity.  Again, this is a matter of hornbook law.  
As to a final judgment or decree to quiet title, Corpus Juris Secundum provides: 
The judgment or decree must determine all issues;  definitely 
fix and settle the rights of the parties; follow the findings and 
decision; and comply with any relevant statutory provisions.  The 
decree should describe the property with reasonable certainty and 
such definiteness as to enable the parties to know the precise limits or 
the location of the boundary lines.   
 
74 C.J.S. Quieting Title, Judgment or Decree and its Enforcement, § 90 
(2007) (emphasis added); citing Ollison v. Village of Climax Springs, 916 
S.W.2d 198, 201 (Mo. 1996) ("It is universally held that judgments should 
describe with reasonable certainty the land adjudicated therein."); Lisher v. 
Krasselt, 492 P.2d 52 (Idaho 1972) (judgment defining rights to land must 
contain a sufficient property description); see also, Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 
1374 (Utah 1977) (judgment provides description of property for public  
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notice to purchasers); Arnold Industries, Inc. v. Love, 63 P.3d 721, 730 
(Utah 2002) (a quiet title decree adjudicating rights to real property includes 
a legal description of the real property).   
 Without a property description in a final judgment, there is no means to 
provide a public record and public notice of the description of the property for 
which title was quieted.   
 Consequently, Blue Ledge's motion for entry of final judgment could not 
have been filed any earlier and, indeed, could not have been granted until Gillmor's 
adverse possession claim was dismissed.  Likewise, incorporating the description 
of the Patented Claims in the final judgment is a basic necessity in this, or any, 
quiet title case; it is never "further relief" or "affirmative relief." 
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth herein, the following orders of the district court 
should be affirmed:  (1) the district court's Ruling and Order, dated November 8, 
2005, granting Blue Ledge's motion for summary judgment for record title in the 
Patented Claims in Blue Ledge; (2) the district court's Ruling and Order, dated 
December 7, 2007, granting Blue Ledge's motion to dismiss Gillmor's adverse 
possession claim for her failure to prosecute; and (3) the district court's Final  
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Judgment, dated March 2 1,2008, quieting title in Blue Ledge to the Patented 
Claims, with a real property description of the Patented Claims. 
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